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Abstract: Malware is a general term for all malicious and unwanted software. Such software poses a major 
security threat to the computer and Internet environment. As an increasing number of people use the 
Internet in their daily life, inevitably users become subject to malware threats.  In the field of digital forensics, 
malware analysis has become a significant discipline. Malicious software is becoming ever more common, 
but also continuously more profit driven, stealthy, and targeted, often organised by illegal associations. 
Furthermore, malware continues to evolve in its sophistication and there are several different types of 
banking malware that pose a very serious threat to bank customers. This paper presents an overview of 
techniques, issues, and examples from the area of malware detection. In particular, we describe Zeus as a 
case study in banking malware.  The sophistication and adaptability of such malware presents a lasting and 
pernicious threat to end-users and organisations.  Despite this danger, we argue that an understanding of 
the infection mechanism coupled with circumspect behaviour on the part of the end-user can contain such 
malware threats. 
KeywordsͶ malware, malicious software, Zeus, security threats, malware detection. 
1 Introduction 
Malware is software that when executed deliberately performs destructive actions intended by the software 
author without the permission of the owner. Often such programs are designed to disable, breakdown, and 
damage the computer system or the network (Zolkipli et al., 2010). This threat appears to be rising day by day 
as a result of sophisticated communication networks and computing technology (Rieck et al., 2008).  
     Malware and related network security threats have become a regular occurrence. These have been 
responsible for misdeeds all over the world, including Internet fraud activities, compromise ŽĨĐůŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
information, data theft, and other types of cybercrime, which all highlight the inherent vulnerabilities and 
weaknesses of software platforms.  Consequently, there is increasing concern for network security, with a major 
focus on malware detection.  With malware equipped with the potential of damaging a computer system, 
infiltrating and breaking ĚŽǁŶƚŚĞŵĂĐŚŝŶĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƵƐĞƌ ?ƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?data and codes require protection against 
replacements and modifications. This also gives rise to security control applications, which become an integral 
part of comƉƵƚĞƌƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŝŶƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚ (Zolkipli et al., 2011).  
      Recent work on malware detection suggests that malware propagation continues to increase at an alarming 
rate.  The intensive use of the Internet and networks enhances the scope for malware to proliferate and also the 
effectiveness of this kind of software.  
       Most malware needs some form of user acceptance to propagate. As such, user awareness plays a very 
important part in the risk of malware infection, but Internet users are easy targets. Many users are completely 
unaware of the security risks and often do not know they have malware on their devices. Moreover, they do not 
have adequate knowledge on how to securely manage and protect their information systems. This lack of 
awareness and inability to take appropriate security measures increases the prevalence and the impact of 
malware.  
2 Malware Types 
There are various types of malware that have been observed in the Internet. Each class is different, and has a 
different effect depending on the host machine. Some types of malware can be easily traced, some are 
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extremely complex and difficult to disable, and others are downright destructive. The following are examples of 
prevalent malware types:      
x Viruses are computer programs that are self-replicating; they modify the content of the files on the 
victim computer by hiding themselves within other seemingly inoffensive programs in order to perform 
a malicious action. Viruses copy themselves from machine to machine through media for example a 
USB device (Distler et al., 2007; Vinod et al., 2009). 
x Worms are usually small self-replicating and self-contained computer programs which perform 
destructive actions by invading computers on a network. Worms have the ability to propagate and self-
replicate, similarly to viruses, although both are entirely different types of malware. Worms replicate 
and propagate directly through networks and they are designed to perform the infection action 
autonomously without human help.  
x Trojan Horses are apparently harmless computer programs and may appear to be useful and entirely 
functional, but in fact they contain harmful components that will insert themselves into a machine and 
install an illicit or malicious action on it. Trojan horses require human assistance in order to spread, due 
to the fact they unable to self-replicate as worms and viruses. The most common one is Zeus which is 
a banking Trojan. The paper will present it as a case study. 
x Spyware is any computer program that is installed on a computer in order to transmit, track and report 
data and information regarding the activities of an internet user without their consent. Spyware is often 
bundled with free software and automatically installs itself with the program that the user was intended 
to use.  
x Adware is software that installs to provide advertisers with information about the browsing habits of 
the users, consequently allowing the advertiser to offer targeted ads.  
x RATS and Backdoors: RATS are Remote Access Trojans, also called Backdoors. They bypass standard 
security controls in order to give unauthorised access to an attacker.  
x KEYLOGGERS are a mainly nefarious type of malware, in that their goal is to secretly collect critical 
information such as passwords, logins or other sensitive information that are manually entered from a 
client device to transmit it back to the source of the infection or to a botnet controlled by that source.  
x Rootkits are the most difficult to detect types of malware, as their goal is to entirely hide malware from 
the client as well as security software that can detect malware. Some rootkits are impossible to detect 
even with forensics. They run at the lowest levels of a specific operating system for which they are 
designed. Their complete function is to hide malware and only noticeable symptom of their attendance 
is unexplained reboots, or blue screen crashes.   
x Droppers are a compressed package of malware. In order to decrease suspicion of surreptitious 
download in progress, their design dictates that they be as small as possible. Droppers are often hidden 
inside a document, email, or other compressed files. Their only purpose is to get access into a system. 
Once installed they will download other file components needed for the malware to perform. They are 
generally compressed with a particularly obfuscated wrapper which is designed to avoid and elude 
detection by anti-virus software by some methods such as encryption.  
x Exploits are specific instances of malware designed to exploit website vulnerabilities, weaknesses and 
design errors in existing operating systems or software. These exploits will perform unauthorised 
ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐĚĞǀŝĐĞand may exploit the poorly written code of Java applets, JavaScript or 
PDF files or documents (McAleavey, 2013, Huang et al., 2011, Distler, et al., 2007, Idika et al., 2007).   
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3 Malware Analysis and Detection Techniques 
ƋƵŝƉƉĞĚǁŝƚŚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨŵĂůǁĂƌĞ ?ƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŵĂůǁĂƌĞĚĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĂŶĂƌĞĂŽĨmajor importance, not only 
to the research community but also to the public. Malware is continuously increasing in complexity, with most 
malware writers using more sophisticated hiding techniques to avoid detection tools. This makes manual 
detection of programmatic faults time consuming and impractical. According to Symantec, over one million new 
malware pieces are created every day (McAleavey, 2013). The most complex hiding techniques are polymorphic, 
metamorphic and packers. For these reasons, there is a strong need to develop further detection methods and 
solutions in order to avoid malware threats and attacks.   
      Malware detection identifies whether code is genuinely malicious or benign. In order to identify different 
malware executables, it is important to understand the behaviour of its aspects; this can be done by executing 
the malware binary. A crucial aspect of efficient malware detection lies in the ability to correctly handle 
obfuscated malware. Detection is performed through the use of a detection system that works to recognise 
malicious software. This takes place through analysis of signatures and use of other techniques, such as 
heuristics parameters (Zolkipli et al., 2011, Idika et al., 2007, Mathur et al., 2013).  
     This section describes existing malware detection methods, and presents a series of techniques, issues, and 
examples relating to malware detection. Currently malware often aims to avoid detection sophisticated 
methods, such as packing and obfuscation. The use of these methods creates many difficult problems in the field 
of malware detection, the most prominent one being a zero-day attack and false positives rates. Detection of 
zero-day threats is at an all-time low.  A zero-day attack is a piece of malware which is new enough that it has 
not yet been detected by any anti-malware company and therefore they do not have a signature for it (Elhadi et 
al., 2012). 
Traditionally, malware detection is built upon two techniques: signature-based and behaviour-based. Each 
of these has specific features that can be applied through static, dynamic or hybrid analysis. 
 
A. Signature Based Techniques 
     Signature-based techniques use a series of commands designed specifically for the malicious software, which 
in turn produces the signature for the malware. Each signature can be captured by specialised researchers within 
laboratory conditions. The aim is that every signature produced is capable of malware recognition, with 
emphasis on detection of malicious behavioural patterns. Signature-based techniques are widely used by 
antivirus detection tools and used to carry out investigations on malware binary disassembled codes, which in 
turn produces the signature. There exist countless debuggers and disassemblers for this purpose. Once this has 
taken place, the code is analysed to extract those features necessary for populating the signature of any group 
of malware. The aim of this method is to replicate the malicious behaviour and use this in detection. This model 
frequently gets referred to as a signature.   
     The main advantage of a signature-based technique is its utility and efficiency.  However, the biggest 
drawback is the difficulty presented in handling new malicious software. Also, it cannot offer the opportunity to 
understand and shed light on malware threats because it ignores the malware functionality and its goals.  The 
reason for this is malware detection software relies only on producing matches and not the behaviour of 
malicious code or its objectives.  Clearly, there is a need to understand malware behaviours and goals in order 
to design and apply avoidance and evasion mechanisms capable of operating successfully within data networks 
and computer systems (Zolkipli et al., 2010). 
 
B. Behaviour-Based Techniques 
    Behaviour based techniques ?ŵĂŝŶƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŝƐƚŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞƚŚĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŽĨƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚŵĂůŝĐŝŽƵƐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ. In 
addition, the basis and target addresses of the malware are included in these behaviours (Mathur et al., 2013; 
Elhadi et al., 2012; Idika et al., 2007). 
   Both malware detection techniques have benefits and drawbacks.  Signature-based techniques take less time 
for scanning and give few false positives. On the other hand, such approaches cannot deal with unknown 
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malware and cannot cope with easy obfuscation in static analysis. One advantage of behaviour-based detection 
is that it gives best results in detecting polymorphic malware (Elhadi et al., 2012; Mathur et al., 2013). 
     There is reason to suppose that combining malware detection approaches can give improved detection.  For 
example, dynamic techniques may be used to analyse the file if static techniques fail to generate significant 
insight.  Moreover, infected files can be analysed using both signature and behaviour based techniques to obtain 
better results (Elhadi et al., 2012; Mathur et al., 2013; Vinod et al., 2009).  
    Some researchers on malware seek to address the limitations of signature-based approaches and improve 
detection rates using techniques such as call graphs, control flow graphs, machine learning and data mining 
techniques and Objective-Oriented Association (OOA). Other data mining and analysis techniques such as finite 
automaton, and neural networks have also been employed in order to improve behaviour-based detection 
techniques.  Fig. 1 illustrates the organization of malware detection techniques (Elhadi et al., 2012).  
 
 
Fig.1: The Organization of Malware Detection Techniques 
       
Static analysis occurs when the infected file undergoes analysis without any execution. It was the first attempt 
to detect malicious software. This analysis can extract information in a low-level for example, system call 
analysis, (CFGs) control flow graphs, and (DFGs) data-flow graphs. By using various tools, this information can 
be collected by decompiling or disassembling the infected files. In order to evade auto malware execution it is 
sometimes better to analyse infected files in a dissimilar environment. Applying static analysis allows for the 
retrieval of safe, fast and low false positive rates. All these advantages help to get fundamental information for 
the purpose of analysis. In contrast, unknown malicious programs that use obfuscation systems are difficult to 
analyse statically, proving that this methodology is not sufficient for every scenario (Elhadi et al., 2012). 
     In order to accomplish a detailed analysis of the malware code and to provide an internal opinion of the 
malware functionality which is referred to as static analysis, software disassemblers and debuggers (such as IDA 
Pro and OllyDBg) can be used. In contrast, dynamic analysis runs the malware and detects the interaction of the 
running malware with the computer from a behavioural perspective (Verma, et al., 2013).  
     Dynamic analysis relates to analysing infected files during its execution within a simulated environment. In 
ŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞƚŚĞĨŝůĞ ?ƐŵĂůŝĐŝŽƵƐ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚŝƐ environment can be a debugger, an emulator or a virtual 
machine. With malware developers using tools like anti-virtual machines to hide their malware functions, the 
static analysis environment becomes unseen to them. In addition, dynamic analysis will fail to detect malicious 
activities if the malware changes its behaviour. This is due to the fact that a particular execution path can be 
examined in every attempt made. 
    Both static and dynamic have advantages and disadvantages. Static analysis is fast and safe, whereas dynamic 
analysis is neither fast nor safe.  Static analysis is good for analyzing multipath malware while this can be difficult 
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is good in detecting unknown malware. In addition, static analysis gives a low level of false positives (Elhadi et 
al., 2012; Mathur et al., 2013). 
     Hybrid analysis is a combination of static and dynamic analysis. The signature specifications of malware codes 
are analysed initially then, for the improvement of complete analysis, they are combined with other behavioural 
parameters. As a result, the limitations of both dynamic and static analysis can be alleviated by use of hybrid 
analysis (Mathur et al., 2013). There have been several techniques that used hybrid detection for analysing and 
controlling malware execution in a newer, well-organized way, such as the HERO technique (Guo et al., 2010). 
Despite being an effective technique, further developments are needed in future for better detection 
correctness, wider detection range, and lower false alarm rates. Nevertheless, the use of such a hybrid technique 
can obtain better results than applying either static or dynamic analysis separately.   
 
4 Zeus 
4.1 Zeus Overview 
In the crime-ware world, a global threat for banking organizations is represented by financial botnets that 
purposely intend to perform financial fraud and other critical information from a client's computer without the 
ŽǁŶĞƌ ?Ɛ consent (Riccari et al., 2010). Generally, there are several types of banking malware; however, all types 
have the same malicious intent. A common example of banking malware is Zeus. A significant feature of Zeus is 
that it is available as source code and not just as executables. In 2011, the source code of Zeus was released to 
the public. Predictably, this resulted in an explosion of new Zeus variants.  
    The Zeus Trojan, also called Zbot, WSNPOEM, NTOS, or PRG is the king of malicious software in the financial 
industry, in both its effectiveness and infection rate. Symantec calls this malware  “Zeus, King of the Underground 
Crime-ǁĂƌĞdŽŽůŬŝƚƐ ? ?/ŶƌĞĐĞŶƚƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ?ĞƵƐďŽƚŶĞƚs have been found responsible for 44% of online malware 
infections during financial transactions and for approximately 90% of global banking fraud (Alazab et al., 2012). 
Zeus is mainly a crime-ǁĂƌĞƚŽŽůƚŚĂƚŝƐĂŝŵĞĚĂƚƐƚĞĂůŝŶŐƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŽŶůŝŶĞďĂŶŬŝŶŐĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐ. Furthermore, the 
Zeus Trojan is extremely dynamic and applies obfuscation techniques such as polymorphic, metamorphic 
encryption and packers in a network of bots. In order to defeat signature-based detection techniques, Zeus re-
encrypts itself automatically in each infection thereby creating a new signature. Thereby, Zeus poses a serious 
risk since it is able to hide malicious intent and can effectively avoid malware signature detection engines. 
     Zeus is a Trojan horse which penetrates large numbers of computers to steal data by logging keystrokes and 
spreads copies of itself to other computers via instant and email messages. Once successfully installed, hackers 
can control and monitor infected devices to obtain access to unauthorised data such as online accounts and 
credentials. 
    As previously mentioned, Zeus is the most significant banking malware currently in existence.  It is a toolkit 
that is used to make a particular strain of Trojans designed to damage and steal information. Stealing details of 
online banking and other login credentials is the major focus of Zeus.   
   The Zeus kit can be obtained from underground forums with older versions, available for free, and the newest 
versions costing many thousands of dollars (Wyke, 2011). The impact of Zeus infection can be very costly to an 
organization and differs to that of individuals. For example, stealing online banking details, or theft of personal 
login details can feel terrible to an individual, whereas the impact of infection for an organization can be 
devastating and felt on a much larger scale. 
 
4.2 Brief History of Zeus 
Since Zeus first emerged in 2007, it has continued the same in its goal for information theft, however, there have 
been several obvious changes in how it addresses this aim. Zeus is simple to use and only requires minimal 
technical knowledge (Wyke, 2011). From 2007, several Zeus Trojan variants have been documented. For 
example, there were about 3.6 million infected computers of Zeus in the USA alone during the period of 2009 
and 2010 and this era is considered the most productive period for Zeus (Binsalleeh et al., 2010). 
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    The Zeus crime-ware toolkit has grown to be one of the preferred tools for attackers due to its competitive 
price and because it has a user-friendly interface. The Zeus toolkit control panel manages and monitors the 
infected systems; it also controls the gathered stolen data and information. In addition, attackers use this crime-
ware tool to steal important information ƐƵĐŚĂƐƵƐĞƌƐ ?ĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐ (Binsalleeh et al., 2010).  
     According to several research labs (Alazab et al., 2012), the Zeus botnet is still developing with new plugin 
releases which can infect even the newest operating systems. For example, in order to take the threat of Zeus 
to a different level, and to generate more sophisticated bots, Zeus has recently combined with the  ?Spy-Eye 
dƌŽũĂŶ ?ƌĞůĞĂƐĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŚĂƐƚǁŽǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐŽĨĂĐŽŶƚƌŽůƉĂŶĞůƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƵƚŝůŝƐĞĚĨŽƌŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ
compromised systems and committing fraud. 
4.3 Functionality 
ĞƵƐdƌŽũĂŶ ?ƐŬĞǇƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŝƐƚŽƐƚĞĂůŽŶůŝŶĞĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐĂƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞĂƚƚĂĐŬĞƌ ?^ŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶǇĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝƚ
performs are information system gathering, online credential information stealing, command and control (C&C) 
server contacting and protected storage information stealing (Falliere et al., 2009). Although technically Zeus is 
a crime-ware kit designed to steal money, from other perspectives, it is a new online illegal business enterprise. 
Within this enterprise different organizations can cooperate with each other in order to commit entire online 
fraud and theft. This becomes a component part of a fully organized cybercriminal organization. In fact, Eastern 
European Organized Crime is the cybercriminal underground that is behind Zeus. Generally, the top bulletproof-
hosted Zeus domains exist in Ukraine and Russia (Micro, 2010).  
4.4 Zeus Crime-ware Tool Components 
In general, to gain monetary profits, the Zeus toolkit takes control of devices causing them to perform as spying 
agents. There are five components that make up the general structure of this toolkit: 
1. Control panel: this manages, controls and gathers the stolen data and information, it also consists of 
PHP scripts which observe the botnet and   display the information to the botmaster.     
2. A builder: two files are generated here; the  ?ďŽƚ ?ĞǆĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŚĞ malware binary and the  ?ĐŽŶĨŝŐ ?ďŝŶ ?
which is the encrypted configuration file.  
3. Configuration files: they involve two files; the  ?ĐŽŶĨŝŐ ?ƚǆƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŝůĞ. The crucial 
information is listed in this file; and the  ?ǁĞďŝŶũĞĐƚƐ ?ƚǆƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐƚŚĞweb injects file. This file is also 
responsible for the recognition of targeted websites and defines the content injection rules. Moreover, 
the configuration files modify the botnet parameters.     
4. Generated encrypted coŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŝůĞƐ ?ĐŽŶĨŝŐ ?ďŝŶ ? ? An encrypted version of the botnet configuration 
parameters is held in these files. 
5. 'ĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚŵĂůǁĂƌĞďŝŶĂƌǇĨŝůĞƐ ?ďŽƚ ?ĞǆĞ ? ?ƚŚese files infect the ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?devices as the binary of the bot 
(Binsalleeh, et al., 2010). 
As the Zeus Trojan is designed to steal sensitive information stored on devices or transferred through web 
browsers and protected storage, it carries a very light foot print. KŶĐĞƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌŚĂƐďĞĞŶŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚ ?
tŚĞƐƚŽůĞŶĚĂƚĂŐĞƚƐ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇƐĞŶƚ ƚŽĂďŽƚ  ? ? ?(a command and control server) through an encrypted 
 ?,ddWWK^d ?ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞby the stolen data is saved.  Furthermore, Zeus allows cybercriminals and hackers 
to inject content into the web page of a bank as it is shown in the infected computer browser. Hackers can 
control the infected systems remotely, as the stolen data is sent to a drop server controlled by a cybercriminal 
known as the botmaster.  
5.  Conclusion 
Writers of malware are becoming more and more profit driven and are incorporating methods in order to make 
their code as stealthy and undetectable as possible. Malware is being written by professional programmers who 
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have a very good understanding of digital forensic techniques and endeavour to create forensic analysis as 
difficult and complicated as possible. The more vulnerable the technology, the more likely it is to be exploitable 
through malware. 
     This paper has looked at the varieties of malware and the ways in which they pose major security threats to 
users. To help understand the risks, we have detailed how malware operates and propagates, and how malware 
may be addressed through the latest malware detection techniques. The study of malware and techniques for 
its detection is ongoing as a specialisation for forensic analysts. Generally, in malware detection there is no single 
technique best suited to detect all types of malicious software. Moreover, countermeasures cannot detect 
unknown malware or unknown signatures that are unique to a specific malware. For example, signature-based 
detection is disadvantageous as it cannot be used to detect novel attacks. As malicious software poses a major 
security threat to Internet users, there is a clear need for end-users to understand the nature of malware and 
the incipient danger of malware threats.   
    Using obfuscation techniques, developers of malicious software are able to create serious threats that render 
traditional anti-virus techniques obsolete and outdated. Detection techniques that rely on software signatures 
are a weak defence against such threats and also prove ineffectual against unknown threats. Anomaly and 
similar behavioural based detection techniques are likely to be more effective against such adversaries.  
     Since Zeus has become the most common banking crime-ware kit in the criminal underground world for 
wholesale financial theft, all Internet and mobile device users should be fully aware of the threat. Importantly, 
ƚŚĞ ?ĐŽŵŵŽŶƵƐĞƌ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĞĚƵĐĂƚĞĚto increase the likelihood that precautions will be taken against infection.  
     A Zeus infection is most likely through receipt of spam email claiming to come from a major organisation, 
such as an insurance agency, internal revenue service, Microsoft or Facebook (Symantec, 2014). Clicking on a 
ůŝŶŬǁŝƚŚŝŶƐƵĐŚĂŶĞŵĂŝůƌĞƐƵůƚƐŝŶĂ ?ĚƌŝǀĞďǇ ?ĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ?ŝĨƚŚĞƵƐĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌŝƐŶŽƚalready protected). 
   The ready availability of Zeus in source code or kit-form ensures that the malware will continue to be used by 
cybercriminals to steal personal information and intercept online financial dealings. Such malware continues to 
evolve and alter the means by which it infects computers.  Principally, it relies upon unpatched or zero-day 
exploits to gain another bot in its net. Such exploits depend for their effect upon users lacking fully patched 
software (vulnerability through legacy exploits), upon users misguidedly activating email attachments (through 
Trojan attachments), or upon users clicking on Web links that lead to unexpected sites (through drive-by zero-
day exploits).  In each of these cases, security awareness on the part of the end-user can successfully avoid such 
infections and protect against data theft.  Despite the sophistication of Zeus and other banking Trojans, a little 
security knowledge and circumspect behaviour can successfully contain such malware.  
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